Book Two: A Criticism of the Highest Values That Have Prevailed Hitherto
III: General Remarks on Morality§294 Criticism of subjective value feelings. The Conscience. Formerly people concluded: conscience condemns this action, therefore this action is reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience condemns an action because that action has been condemned for a long period of time: all conscience does is to imitate: it does not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was not conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against) its consequences —
The approbation of conscience, the feeling of well-being, of “inner peace”, is of the same order of emotions as the artist’s joy over his work: it proves nothing —
Self-contentment proves no more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than its absence can prove anything against the value of the thing which fails to give rise to it. We are far too ignorant to be able to judge of the value of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability to regard things objectively. Even when we condemn an action, we do not do so as judges, but as adversaries —
When noble sentiments accompany an action, they prove nothing in its favour: an artist may present us with an absolutely insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of the most exalted pathos during its production. One should say rather that these sentiments are misleading: they actually beguile our eye and our power, away from criticism, from caution and from suspicion, so that we make fools of ourselves — they actually make fools of us.