Book Two: A Criticism of the Highest Values That Have Prevailed Hitherto
II: Criticism of Morality
§273 But do not let us fear: as a matter of fact, we require a great deal of morality, in order to be immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a parable.
A physiologist interested in a certain illness and an invalid who wishes to be cured of that same illness, have not the same interests. Let us suppose that the illness happens to be morality — for morality is an illness — and that we Europeans are the invalid: what an amount of subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans were, at once, our own inquisitive spectators and the physiologist above-mentioned! Should we under these circumstances earnestly desire to rid ourselves of morality? Should we want to? This is of course irrespective of the question, whether we should be able to do so?