Book Two: A Criticism of the Highest Values That Have Prevailed Hitherto
II: Criticism of Morality§270 How is it possible that a man can respect himself only in regard to moral values, that he subordinates and despises everything in favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation, etc. As for instance, Henri Fred. Amiel. What is the meaning of the moral idiosyncrasy? I mean this both in the psychological and physiological sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which other great qualities are not wanting; and even in the case of Schopenhauer, who obviously valued what he did not and could have — is it not the result of a merely mechanical moral interpretation of real states of pain and displeasure? Is it not a particular form of sensibility which does not happen to understand the cause of its many unpleasurable feelings, but thinks to explain them with moral hypotheses! In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and strength always appears under the optics of a “clean conscience”, flooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness of salvation —
Thus the moral idiosyncratist has (1) either acquired his real worth in approximating to the virtuous type of society: “the good fellow”, “the upright man” a sort of medium state of high respectability: mediocre in all his abilities, but honest, conscientious, firm, respected and tried, in all his aspirations; (2) or, he imagines he has acquired that worth, simply because he cannot otherwise understand all his states; he is unknown to himself; he therefore interprets himself in this fashion.
Morality is the only scheme of interpretation by means of which this type of man can tolerate himself: is it a form of pride?