I don’t believe that the so-called problem of evil ever rises to the level of a bona fide, intellectually serious problem, and I’ve set out my reasons in the past. It’s not a subject that actually strokes my interest nowadays.
BUT! In the midst of a global pandemic, pastors worldwide reluctant to cancel services, and actual– and dimestore-theologians meditating and pontificating on the so-called problem as the laity seek to comprehend the mind of the divine, I think it’s worth a few minutes to explain, once again, why the so-called “problem of evil” is in fact an exemplar for the reason that nobody, anywhere, should ever take seriously anything said by a theologian of any variety. This is particularly relevant because believers are dying disproportionately, thanks to pastors who summon them to communal worship.
Why does an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-loving god permit evil?
The question comprehends both natural and moral evil, the earthquake that shakes down your home and the embezzler who flees to Bimini as he bankrupts your company. The question sets out three specific premises: God is all knowing, so he knows of individual suffering; God is all-powerful, so he can relieve suffering; God is all-loving, so he wants to end suffering.
Unspoken, however, are several antecedent premises: Supernatural beings exist, the specific supernatural being so beloved by Abraham exists, that being has an interest in the affairs of men, and that being has explained via the Bible how his favor may be won.
Clearly, some of the premises rely on the truth of other premises.
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There is at least one supernatural being.
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That supernatural being is the supernatural being that Abraham spoke with.
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That supernatural being wants to interact with us.
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That supernatural being superintended the production of the Bible in order to facilitate pleasing him.
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That supernatural being is all-knowing.
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That supernatural being is all-powerful.
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That supernatural being is all-loving.
This is where the logical sleight-of-hand comes in: If you can’t prove that Abraham’s Invisible Friend is real, then there is no basis for making claims about his characteristics. None.
And the so-called problem, then, amounts to no more than this: The world doesn’t look as we’d expect it to look if all those unsubstantiated premises, and unsubstantiated contingent premises, were true.
As the kids say: Duhhh …